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Abstract 
Two experiments examined how mock jurors’ beliefs about three factors known to influence 
eyewitness memory accuracy relate to decision-making (age of eyewitness and presence of 
weapon in Study 1, length of eyewitness identification decision time in Study 2).  Psychology 
undergraduates rendered verdicts and evaluated trial participants after reading a robbery-murder 
trial summary that varied eyewitness age (6, 11, 42, or 74 years) and weapon presence (visible or 
not) in Study 1 and eyewitness decision length (2-3 or 30 seconds) in Study 2 (n=200 each).  The 
interactions between participant belief about these variables and the manipulated variables 
themselves were the heart of this study.  Participants’ beliefs about eyewitness age and weapon 
presence interacted with these manipulations, but only for some judgments – verdict for 
eyewitness age and eyewitness credibility for weapon focus.  The exploratory meditational 
analyses found only one relation: juror belief about eyewitness age mediated the relation 
between eyewitness age and credibility ratings.  These results highlight a need for juror 
education and specialized voir dire in cases where legitimate concerns exist regarding the 
reliability of eyewitness memory (e.g., child eyewitness, weapon presence during event, long 
eyewitness identification time).  If erroneous juror beliefs can be corrected their impact may be 
reduced.   
 
Keywords: eyewitness testimony, eyewitness age, weapon focus, eyewitness identification speed, 
juror belief 
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The Effects of Jurors’ Beliefs about Eyewitness Performance on Trial Judgments 
 Eyewitness evidence is one of the most compelling types of evidence presented at trial, as 
jurors place great weight on the testimony of eyewitnesses (Devenport, Penrod, & Cutler, 1997; 
Lindsay, 1994; Penrod & Cutler, 1995).  However, laypeople are often naive to the value of 
various predictors of eyewitness memory accuracy, the consequences of which may be jurors 
making judgments based in part on erroneous intuitions (Benton, Ross, Bradshaw, Thomas, & 
Bradshaw, 2006; Deffenbacher & Loftus, 1982; Devenport et al., 1997; Kassin & Barndollar, 
1992; Lindsay, 1994; Read & Desmarais, 2009).  For instance, jurors assume a positive 
correlation between eyewitness confidence and accuracy; in fact, the most powerful predictor of 
mock jurors’ verdicts is eyewitness confidence (Cutler, Penrod, & Dexter, 1990; Cutler, Penrod 
& Stuve, 1988).  However, contrary to jurors’ beliefs, eyewitness confidence is not a strong 
indicator of accuracy (Penrod & Cutler, 1995; Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 1995).   
Other research has demonstrated potential jurors do not appreciate many factors related to 
eyewitness accuracy.  For example, the impact of the cross-race effect or how lineup instructions 
can affect eyewitness identification is not well understood (Lindsay, 1994); the ability of 
hypnosis to aid memory retrieval is overestimated, and the effects of exposure time, lineup 
selection procedures, and hypnotic suggestibility are underestimated (Kassin & Barndollar, 
1992); and arousal’s negative impact on accurate recall is not appreciated (Bornstein, 
Zickafoose, & O’Bryant, 2008).  Other factors that may predict eyewitness accuracy include age 
of the eyewitness, whether or not a weapon was present during the occurrence of the crime, and 
the length of time it takes the eyewitness to identify a perpetrator during a lineup.  Researchers 
have examined the effects of these variables on juror decisions; however, jurors’ beliefs about 
these variables and the effects of those beliefs on decisions have not been empirically examined. 
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Age of the Eyewitness 
An abundance of research has addressed age effects on eyewitness memory. The ability 
to retain accurate descriptive information in memory after witnessing an event increases with age 
(Leippe & Romanczyk, 1989; Poole & White, 1991; Roebers & Schneider, 2001), as does 
accurate face identification (Pozzulo & Lindsay, 1998).  However, elderly adults perform 
significantly worse than younger adults at face-recognition tasks (Bartlett & Memon, 2007), and 
they have less accurate memories and are disproportionately influenced by erroneous suggestions 
compared to younger adults (Mueller-Johnson, 2005).  Thus it appears young to middle 
adulthood is the peak age range for eyewitness performance accuracy.    
Laypeople regard the age of an eyewitness as important for determining the accuracy of 
eyewitness identification (Golding, Dunlap, & Hodell, 2009; Holcomb & Jacquin, 2007; Leippe, 
Manion, & Romanczyk, 1992; Newcombe & Bransgrove, 2007; Pozzulo & Dempsey, 2009; 
Pozzulo, Lemieux, Wells, & McCuaig, 2006; Ross, Dunning, Toglia, & Ceci, 1990).  However, 
surveys assessing experts’ (Kassin, Tubb, Hosch, & Memon, 2001) and laypersons’ (Benton et 
al., 2006) beliefs about factors affecting eyewitness accuracy demonstrate experts are 
significantly more likely to agree that young children and elderly eyewitnesses are less accurate 
than younger adults, indicating jurors may rely on erroneous beliefs in decision-making. 
A number of jury simulations have examined the effect of eyewitness age on mock 
jurors’ decisions, especially in the context of child sexual abuse (CSA) cases (Bottoms, Golding, 
Stevenson, Wiley, & Yozwiak, 2007), where a majority of jurors cite the child’s testimony as the 
most important evidence (Myers, Redlich, Goodman, Prizmich, & Imwinkelried, 1999). Jurors 
generally perceive younger children as less cognitively capable than older children or adults, but 
as more trustworthy and honest; in the case of CSA or other sex crimes, children’s credibility is 
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also aided by the perception that they are more sincere and sexually naive (Bottoms et al., 2007).  
Less research has studied jurors’ perceptions of elderly witnesses, but there is evidence that they 
are perceived as less cognitive capable yet more honest than young adults (Ross et al., 1990). 
The Weapon Focus Effect  
A second factor demonstrated to predict eyewitness accuracy is weapon presence during 
the commission of a crime. The presence of a weapon can reduce the ability to recall details 
unrelated to the weapon (e.g., clothing and characteristics of the suspect; Pickel, 2007; Shaw & 
Skolnick, 1994; Steblay, 1992), and reduces the probability of an eyewitness identifying the 
offender (Pickel, 2007).  Surveys assessing expert (Kassin et al., 2001) and laypersons’ (Benton 
et al., 2006; Read & Desmarais, 2009) beliefs about factors affecting eyewitness accuracy 
indicate experts better appreciate memory limitations when a weapon is present, suggesting 
again that jurors may make decisions based partially on erroneous beliefs. However, we know of 
no studies of juror or jury decision making as a function of weapon presence/absence. 
Length of Identification Time during Lineups 
A third factor that predicts the accuracy of eyewitness identification is the length of time 
the identification takes during a lineup.  Faster identifications are, in general, more likely to be 
correct than slower decisions (Dunning & Stern, 1994; Sauerland & Sporer, 2009; Sporer, 1993, 
1994). Nevertheless, there is considerable variability in opinions about identification speed 
(Benton et al., 2006; Read & Desmarais, 2009).  The pattern suggests many mock jurors believe 
fast identifications are more accurate and may base decisions on that belief; however, there is not 
a strong expert consensus on whether identification speed has any relation to accuracy, despite 
several studies suggesting such a relationship. In addition, there have been no studies of how 
mock jurors respond to variations in eyewitness identification speed.  
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The Present Research  
We conducted two studies to determine how mock jurors’ beliefs about three factors 
relate to their decision making (age of the eyewitness and presence of a weapon in Study 1, and 
length of eyewitness identification decision time in Study 2). We chose these three factors not 
because they exhaust all of the factors about which jurors might have erroneous beliefs, but 
because of their prevalence in a large number of witnessing and identification situations.  In 
these studies, college students serving as mock jurors read a simulated criminal trial in which we 
varied the level of the three variables (eyewitness age, weapon presence, and identification time) 
to determine whether mock jurors’ beliefs were related to their trial decisions. 
Study 1: Eyewitness Age and Weapon Presence. 
Study 1 examined the relations between mock jurors’ judgments and their beliefs 
regarding eyewitness age and weapon presence. Overall, we hypothesized mock jurors would be 
somewhat sensitive to these factors, and that their beliefs would be related to their trial 
judgments.  Specifically, we predicted: (1) A main effect of eyewitness age, such that more not-
guilty verdicts will be rendered when the eyewitness is a child or elderly adult (compared with a 
middle-aged adult). Young and elderly adult eyewitnesses will also be less credible, and will lead 
to perceptions of lower defendant culpability. Although child and elderly witnesses can be quite 
credible when the major component of credibility is their honesty or sincerity (e.g., in CSA 
cases), they are less credible than young adult witnesses when the case emphasizes cognitive 
competence (Bottoms et al., 2007). In the case used here, the eyewitness is a bystander with no 
motivation to lie, leading to the predicted age effect.  (2) A main effect of weapon presence, such 
that weapon presence will lead to more not guilty verdicts, lower defendant culpability, and 
lower eyewitness credibility.  (3) An interaction between eyewitness age and participant belief 
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about the effects of eyewitness age on reliability.  Specifically, participants who believe younger 
eyewitnesses are less reliable will render more negative judgments when a younger eyewitness 
testifies compared to the middle-age condition, whereas participants who believe younger 
eyewitnesses are more reliable will render more positive judgments when a younger eyewitness 
testifies compared to the middle-age condition.  (4) An interaction between weapon presence and 
participant belief in the weapon focus effect.  Specifically, participants who believe weapon 
presence interferes with memories of the event unrelated to the weapon (i.e., those who believe 
in the weapon focus effect) will render more negative judgments when a weapon is present 
compared to when it is not.  Participants who do not believe in the weapon focus effect will 
render more positive judgments when a weapon is present compared to when it is not.   
Method 
Participants.  Two hundred jury-eligible undergraduate students (60.5% female) at the 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln participated. Participants were representative of the university’s 
population (mean age = 19.84, 88% White).  Recruitment took place through the psychology 
department’s internet-based subject pool.  Participants received course credit for participation.   
Materials and Procedure.  Each participant, through random assignment, received one 
of eight versions of a criminal trial summary.  A 2 x 4 between-groups factorial design was 
utilized to examine effects of eyewitness age (6, 11, 42, or 74 years) and weapon presence 
(weapon visible or not) on mock jurors’ decisions.  The trial summary described a convenience 
store robbery in which an eyewitness observed a culprit either with or without a gun.  The 
eyewitness was the only person with a clear view of the robbery, and he claimed to remember 
what the perpetrator looked like and was able to pick the alleged robber out of a lineup.  The 
eyewitness testified that the defendant was the person who robbed the store.  
The Effects of Jurors’ Beliefs             9 
Participants were first asked to fill out a questionnaire concerning beliefs and attitudes 
about the legal system, which included questions about participants’ beliefs about the effects of 
eyewitness age and weapon presence on eyewitness reliability (Deffenbacher & Loftus, 1982).  
These questions were rated on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) point scale.  
Participants with higher values on the child eyewitness reliability item (e.g., “A child eyewitness 
is more reliable than an adult eyewitness”) endorsed a stronger belief in the reliability of child 
eyewitnesses compared to those with lower values (i.e., low values were more consistent with 
the empirical literature).  Participants with higher values on the weapon focus effect question 
endorsed a stronger belief in the effect (“When a person sees a weapon while witnessing a crime, 
s/he will have a reduced ability to remember the details of the event”; i.e., high values were more 
consistent with the empirical literature). 
After reading the transcript, participants completed additional questionnaires.  They 
provided demographic information, a verdict, and rated the credibility of the witnesses (1, low to 
5, high).1  In addition to the dichotomous verdict decision, participants also rated the perceived 
culpability of the defendant (0-100%).    
Results 
Please refer to Table 1 for descriptive statistics.  We examined whether participant age, 
gender, or race moderated any of our effects.  They did not, so we did not include them in our 
models.  To examine our hypotheses about verdict decision, we performed a binary logistic 
regression.  Predictors included eyewitness age (categorical), weapon presence (categorical), 
participant belief about the effect of eyewitness age and weapon presence on accuracy (each 
1 Although mock jurors rated the credibility of several witnesses included in the transcript, we only report the 
eyewitness credibility ratings in this paper because our focus here is on perceptions of the eyewitness.  Results on 
credibility of the other witnesses are available from the first author.    
                                                 
The Effects of Jurors’ Beliefs             10 
continuous), and the interactions between eyewitness age x belief about age and weapon 
presence x belief about weapon presence.   
Verdict decision was significantly related to eyewitness age (Odds Ratio = 0.02, 95% CI 
= 0.00 – 0.72, p = 0.03).  Specifically, the 42-year–old eyewitness elicited fewer not guilty 
(15%) verdicts compared to child (22% and 23%) and elderly (29%) eyewitnesses.  The 
interaction between eyewitness age and participant belief about the effect of eyewitness age 
emerged in the predicted direction (Odds Ratio = 2.66, 95% CI = 0.99 – 7.13, p = 0.05).  When 
the eyewitness was 6 years old, mock jurors who convicted the defendant believed child 
eyewitnesses were more reliable (M= 3.32, SD=0.84) than those who found the defendant not 
guilty (M=4.10, SD=0.87), t(51)=3.17, p=0.003.  For eyewitnesses of all other ages, the beliefs of 
mock jurors who convicted and acquitted did not differ significantly, ts < 0.9. 
 [Insert Table 1 about here] 
To examine the remaining hypotheses, we conducted a between-groups multivariate 
analysis of covariance (MANCOVA).  We included two categorical independent variables (age of 
eyewitness and weapon presence), two continuous independent variables entered as covariates 
(strength of participant belief in child eyewitnesses reliability and the weapon focus effect), and 
the interactions between eyewitness age x age belief and weapon presence x weapon focus effect 
belief.  The dependent variables were eyewitness credibility and defendant culpability.   
The results of the overall omnibus tests were significant for four of the independent 
variables.  We found significant omnibus main effects for eyewitness age, Wilks’ Lambda = 
0.79, F(6, 382) = 7.83, p < 0.001, etap2 = 0.11; strength of participant belief in child eyewitness 
reliability, Wilks’ Lambda = 0.96, F(2, 191) = 3.75, p = 0.025, etap2 = 0.04; strength of 
participant belief in the weapon focus effect, Wilks’ Lambda = 0.97, F(2, 191) = 3.32, p = 0.038, 
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etap2 =0.03; and the interaction between weapon presence and the strength of participants’ beliefs 
about the weapon focus effect, Wilks’ Lambda = 0.96, F(2, 191) = 3.58, p = 0.03, etap2 = 0.04.  
Nonsignificant effects included the predicted main effect of weapon presence and the predicted 
interaction between eyewitness age and strength of participant belief in child eyewitness 
accuracy, Wilks’ Lambdas < 0.96, Fs < 4.32, ps > 0.05, etap2 < 0.04.   
We further explored these findings by using separate univariate ANCOVAs with follow-
up LSD post-hoc analyses when appropriate.  We observed significant univariate effects of age 
of eyewitness on defendant culpability ratings, F (3, 192) = 5.14, p = .002, etap2 = .07.  
Consistent with our hypothesis, the 42- year-old eyewitness (M = 70.98, SD = 22.69) elicited 
significantly higher defendant culpability ratings than the 6-year-old (M = 56.83, SD = 28.99) 
and 74-year-old eyewitness (M = 54.24, SD = 25.31), p = 0.003 and <0.001, respectively.  We 
also found significant differences between the eyewitness age groups on credibility ratings, F (3, 
192) = 14.00, p < 0.001, etap2 = 0.18.  The 42-year-old eyewitness elicited significantly higher 
ratings (M = 3.94, SD = 0.94) than any of the other three groups, p <0.002. 
Although we did not formulate any a priori hypotheses regarding main effects of 
participant beliefs, we found significant univariate effects for the strength of belief that child 
eyewitnesses are more accurate than adults on both defendant culpability ratings (β = 5.22, t = 
2.73, p =0.007, etap2= 0.04) and eyewitness credibility ratings (β = 0.15, t = 2.12, p =0.036, 
etap2= .02).  The positive relation between defendant culpability ratings and child eyewitness 
accuracy belief indicates that for each unit increase participants endorsed on the 5-point child 
eyewitness accuracy belief item, culpability ratings for the defendant increased by 5.22%.  The 
relation between child eyewitness accuracy belief and eyewitness credibility ratings indicates 
that for each unit increase participants endorsed on the 5-point child eyewitness accuracy item, 
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eyewitness credibility ratings increased by 0.15 units on the 1 to 5 scale.  No significant main 
effect was found for strength of weapon focus belief on either defendant culpability ratings or 
eyewitness credibility ratings (βs < 4.18, ts < 1.87, ps > 0.06).   
We hypothesized an interaction between participants’ beliefs and the manipulated 
conditions (age and weapon presence) consistent with their beliefs.  As explained above, no 
relations between eyewitness age and strength of participant belief in child eyewitness reliability 
were found.  Likewise, the predicted interaction between weapon presence and strength of 
participant belief in the weapon focus effect did not emerge for defendant culpability ratings, β = 
0.88, t = 0.27, p = 0.79, etap2 < 0.001.  However, the predicted interaction between weapon 
presence and strength of participant belief in the weapon focus effect did emerge for eyewitness 
credibility, β = 0.26, t = 2.10, p = 0.037, etap2 = 0.02.  A stronger belief in the weapon focus 
effect was associated with higher eyewitness credibility ratings when the weapon was absent, but 
with lower credibility ratings when the weapon was present (see Figure 1).    
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 We conducted exploratory analyses to see whether juror beliefs mediated the relation 
between the independent variables (eyewitness age, weapon presence) and the continuous 
dependent variables (eyewitness credibility, defendant culpability).  Baron and Kenny’s (1986) 
method and Sobel (1982) tests were used to explore these relationships, which produced identical 
findings (we present only the Baron and Kenny analysis here).  Although we explored four 
potential meditational models, only one emerged as significant.  We found support for juror 
beliefs about the effect of eyewitness age as a mediator between eyewitness age and credibility.   
As per Baron and Kenny’s (1986) method, regression analyses found that eyewitness age 
(the IV) accounted for a significant portion of variance in juror belief (the mediator), β= 0.22, 
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t(199)= 3.18, p= 0.002, and eyewitness age (IV) significantly predicted eyewitness credibility 
(DV), β= 0.17, t(199)= 2.41, p= 0.017.  In a separate model testing the relations between both the 
IV and the mediator on the DV, the mediator (juror belief) remained significant, β= 0.27, t(199)= 
3.89, p< 0.001, whereas the effect of the IV (eyewitness age) was no longer significant, β= 0.11, 
t(44)= 1.57, p= 0.12, indicating that full mediation was demonstrated.     
Discussion 
This study examined the relation between mock jurors’ judgments and beliefs regarding 
eyewitness age and weapon presence.  Consistent with our hypotheses, mock jurors were 
generally sensitive to these factors, and beliefs were related to trial judgments.  A main effect of 
eyewitness age emerged on verdict, defendant culpability, and eyewitness credibility ratings, 
such that the adult eyewitness elicited significantly fewer not guilty verdicts and elicited higher 
culpability and credibility ratings compared to child and elderly eyewitnesses.  These findings 
are encouraging, as they are consistent with empirical findings that adults are better eyewitnesses 
than both children (Pozzulo & Lindsay, 1998; Poole & White, 1991; Roebers & Schneider, 
2001) and elderly adults (Bartlett & Memon, 2007; Mueller-Johnson, 2005).   
Although verdict decisions showed the predicted interaction between eyewitness age and 
participant belief, ratings of culpability and credibility did not.  This may indicate jurors were 
indeed affected by the independent variables (as evidenced by the differential verdict decisions), 
but that the effect did not significantly influence lower order judgments – the culpability and 
credibility ratings.  Other research has found a similar pattern of results: although successful 
manipulations may affect verdict or credibility ratings, one does not always translate into the 
other as a function of the manipulation (e.g., Abshire & Bornstein, 2003; Lindsay, 1994). 
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Unexpectedly, a significant main effect was found for strength of participant belief in 
child eyewitness reliability on both defendant culpability and eyewitness credibility ratings.  
Both increased as participant endorsement of child eyewitness reliability increased.  This finding 
suggests mock jurors naive to the limitations of child eyewitness reliability are also likely to 
believe witnesses are more credible and defendants are more culpable in general. Less 
knowledgeable jurors may hold erroneous beliefs that influence broad trial perceptions.  Surveys 
assessing beliefs about eyewitness age and reliability suggest jurors are less knowledgeable than 
experts (Kassin et al., 2001; Benton et al., 2006).  It appears in this study that the effects of 
erroneous juror beliefs about eyewitness age and reliability predict trial perceptions. 
We hypothesized a main effect of weapon presence; however, it did not emerge in any of 
the analyses.  This is surprising because the presence of a weapon is known to affect memory for 
details of the event unrelated to the weapon (Pickel, 2007; Shaw & Skolnick, 1994; Steblay, 
1992).  The findings are consistent with surveys indicating mock jurors are significantly less 
knowledgeable about the weapon focus effect than experts (Benton et al., 2006; Kassin et al., 
2001; Read & Desmarais, 2009).  One possible reason no main effect emerged for weapon 
presence is because the manipulation may not have been effective.  A limitation of this study is 
that we did not include a manipulation check for either the eyewitness age or weapon presence 
variable; therefore, it is possible participants did not discern a difference between conditions. 
The predicted interactions involving weapon focus were partially supported.  Findings 
suggest mock jurors who hold correct beliefs perceive the credibility of witnesses consistent with 
the literature (e.g., Pickel, 2007).  However, the non-significant interaction for defendant 
culpability ratings or verdict indicates the effect of correct beliefs may be limited only to 
judgments of the eyewitness’ credibility.  This may be because the weapon focus effect would 
The Effects of Jurors’ Beliefs             15 
have the most immediate impact on the eyewitness’ memory for the details of the event unrelated 
to the weapon, whereas judgments of defendant culpability and verdict are more distally related.     
Study 2: Length of Eyewitness Identification Time 
We conducted Study 2 to examine whether, and in what ways, mock juror beliefs about 
lineup identification speed affect their decisions.  Based on the literature, we hypothesized mock 
jurors would be somewhat sensitive to this factor, and that their beliefs would be related to their 
trial judgments.  Specifically, we predicted: (1) A main effect of length of identification time, 
such that slower identifications will result in more not guilty verdicts than faster identifications. 
Slower identifications will also result in lower eyewitness credibility and defendant culpability 
ratings.  (2) An interaction between length of identification time and participant belief about 
decision time.  Specifically, participants who believe faster identifications are more likely to be 
accurate will render more positive judgments in the fast condition compared to the slow 
condition and vice-versa.   
Method 
Participants. Two hundred jury-eligible undergraduate students (67% female) at the 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln participated.  Participants were representative of the university’s 
population (mean age = 20.45 years, largely White).  Recruitment took place through the 
psychology department’s internet-based subject pool, and participants received course credit.   
Design.  Participants were randomly assigned to either a relatively long or short 
eyewitness identification time condition.  The strength of participants’ beliefs in the accuracy of 
identification time was measured by their response to an item in a pre-trial questionnaire (“The 
more quickly an eyewitness identifies a person as the perpetrator in a lineup, the more accurate 
the identification is likely to be [compared to an identification that takes a longer time]”; Kassin 
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et al., 2001).  Participants rated their response on a Likert-Type scale, from 1, “strongly agree” 
to 5, “strongly disagree.”  The dependent variables were the verdict rendered (guilty/ not guilty), 
defendant culpability ratings, (0-100%), and witness credibility ratings (1, low to 5, high).   
Materials.  Participants were given a 17-page transcript of a robbery-murder case, with 
similar case facts to the trial used in Study 1, except for a few minor differences (e.g., the 
eyewitness in Study 2 was female).  The eyewitness’ testimony consisted of her report of 
observing a robbery-murder in a convenience store in which she worked.  She was looking out of 
a window from an office about 20 feet away from the perpetrator.  When asked how long it took 
her to identify the defendant (from a simultaneous lineup), she responded, “I made my decision 
as soon as I saw him” in the fast condition, whereas in the slow condition she said, “I had to 
think about it for a while before I could be sure of my choice.”   
The police officer witness gave a general description of the lineup procedure.  Upon 
cross-examination, he testified about the length of time it took the eyewitness to identify the 
defendant.  In the fast condition he said, “It was quite fast, two or three seconds, maybe.”  In the 
slow condition he said, “[she] debated for about thirty seconds.”  These measures were based on 
Sporer’s (1993) findings that the average “correct” decision time was 3.47 seconds and the 
average “incorrect” decision time was 13.33 seconds.   
Procedure.  Participants read a consent form and were instructed to pretend they had 
been selected as a juror in the case.  They filled out a 20-item Juror Attitude Survey, which 
included the belief about identification speed item.  They were then asked to read the transcript 
and give their verdict, rate the defendant’s culpability and each witness’ credibility,2 and answer 
2 Although mock jurors rated the credibility of several witnesses, we only report the eyewitness credibility ratings 
here because our focus is on perceptions of the eyewitness.  Results on credibility of the other witnesses are 
available from the first author.    
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a manipulation check question concerning identification speed.  The procedure took 30 to 40 
minutes and was completed individually. 
Results 
Please refer to Table 2 for descriptive statistics.  The manipulation check revealed the 
eyewitness identification speed manipulation was perceived as intended.  Ninety-seven percent 
correctly reported their perception of the fast condition as relatively fast, and sixty-one percent in 
the slow condition reported their perception as relatively slow, X²(1, 199) = 78.96, p < 0.001, θ = 
0.04.  Participants who failed the manipulation check were excluded from further analyses.   
To examine our hypotheses about verdict decision, a binary logistic regression with 
verdict as the DV and eyewitness identification speed (categorical), strength of participant belief 
about the effect of identification speed (continuous), and the interaction between the two 
variables as predictors was computed.  Consistent with our hypothesis, the defendant was less 
likely to be found guilty when the identification was slow (6%) compared to when it was fast 
(47%) (Odds Ratio = 55.80, 95% CI = 3.32 – 937.17, p = 0.005).  The predicted interaction 
between length of identification time and participant belief about the effect of length of 
identification time did not emerge (Odds Ratio = 0.55, 95% CI = 0.24 – 1.24, p = 0.15). 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
To examine the remaining hypotheses, we conducted a between-groups multivariate 
analysis of covariance (MANCOVA).  We included one categorical IV (identification time), one 
continuous IV entered as a covariate (strength of juror belief that faster identifications are more 
accurate), and the interaction. Our two continuous DVs were defendant culpability and 
eyewitness credibility.  A significant omnibus main effect was found for identification speed, 
Wilks’ Lambda = 0.96, F(2, 152) = 3.61, p = 0.029, etap2 = 0.05.  The predicted interaction 
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between identification speed and speed belief did not emerge, and no main effect was found for 
speed belief, Wilks’ Lambdas < 1.0, Fs (2, 152) <  1.75, ps > 0.17. 
Significant univariate effects of identification speed emerged on defendant culpability [F 
(1, 153) = 5.68, p = 0.018, etap2 = 0.04] and eyewitness credibility [F (1, 153) = 5.45, p = 0.021, 
etap2 = 0.03] ratings.  Consistent with our hypotheses, slower identifications were associated with 
lower culpability ratings (M = 51.65, SD = 27.15) than faster identifications (M = 68.88, SD = 
28.51), and slower identifications elicited lower credibility ratings (M = 3.32, SD = 0.98) than 
faster identifications (M = 3.62, SD = 0.93).   
As in Study 1, we conducted exploratory analyses to discern whether juror beliefs might 
mediate the relation between the independent variable (identification decision speed) and the 
continuous dependent variables (eyewitness credibility, defendant culpability).  Baron and 
Kenny’s (1986) method and Sobel (1982) tests were used to explore these potential meditational 
relationships.  Although we explored both potential meditational models, neither emerged as 
significant; therefore, it does not appear juror beliefs mediate this relation.   
Discussion 
This study examined the effect of eyewitness identification time on mock juror decisions, 
including the degree to which intuition about identification time plays a role.  Our hypothesis 
that identification time would emerge as a main effect for each of the dependent variables was 
supported.  This is an encouraging finding, as it is consistent with research findings that faster 
identifications are more likely to be accurate (e.g., Sauerland & Sporer, 2009). 
The null findings for the main effect of participant belief and the interaction between 
identification time and participant belief may be due to a weak relation between the variables, or 
it may be because participants underestimate the effects of identification time, as Kassin and 
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Barndollar (1992) found with other eyewitness factors.  Alternatively, this can be interpreted as 
encouraging, because although some jurors indicated a belief that slower identifications are more 
likely to be accurate, the effect of these erroneous beliefs on judgments was minimal. 
The results of the manipulation check showed the identification speed manipulation was 
perceived as intended.  Although this was a “successful” manipulation statistically, participants 
in the slow condition made more errors in the manipulation check (39%) than those in the fast 
condition (3%).  Thus, the slow condition manipulation may not have been strong enough to 
elicit some expected results.  Future studies should attempt a more recognizably slow condition 
to examine the effect on jurors’ decisions (e.g., the slow condition could take 3 minutes rather 
than 30 seconds). 
General Discussion 
How well do jurors’ beliefs predict trial judgments?  Previous research indicates the 
beliefs with which jurors arrive in court can influence their trial perceptions and decisions (e.g., 
Bornstein et al., 2008). This reality is problematic for the legal system when juror beliefs are 
erroneous.  We conducted the current studies to examine the effects of juror beliefs regarding 
problematic situations identified in previous research (e.g., child and elderly eyewitness, weapon 
focus, and a slow identification).  
The main effects of eyewitness age and identification time parallels empirical knowledge 
regarding how eyewitness age and identification time actually predict eyewitness reliability.  
Unexpectedly, no main effects of weapon presence emerged, which is not in line with empirical 
findings that the presence of a weapon negatively affects eyewitness memory for details of the 
crime and perpetrator identification (Pickel, 2007; Shaw & Skolnick, 1994; Steblay, 1992).  
However, an interaction between weapon effect belief and weapon presence emerged. 
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The interactions between the manipulated variables and participant belief about them 
were the heart of this study.  We hypothesized an interaction between the independent variable 
and the relevant participant belief for each dependent variable.  The hypothesis was partially 
supported, but only for eyewitness age and weapon presence, and only for some judgments – 
verdict for eyewitness age, and eyewitness credibility for weapon focus.  Although it is not clear 
why these conceptually related dependent variables would have different outcomes, a similar 
pattern has been obtained by other researchers (e.g., Abshire & Bornstein, 2003; Lindsay, 1994).  
No interactions were found for identification speed and participant belief.  The directions of the 
significant interactions are in line with what would be expected based on participant belief.  
These results are both encouraging and discouraging.  Juror beliefs do predict at least some 
perceptions and judgments at trial.  This is encouraging when juror beliefs are in line with 
empirical findings, but discouraging when juror beliefs are erroneous.   
The exploratory mediational analyses in each study found only one relation: juror beliefs 
about eyewitness age significantly mediated the relation between eyewitness age and credibility.  
It makes theoretical sense that the relation between eyewitness age and credibility would be 
mediated through juror beliefs about the effects of eyewitness age, because these variables are all 
directly related.  Although it was somewhat surprising that the same pattern was not found when 
defendant culpability served as the DV, this may be due to the fact that eyewitness credibility is 
more directly related to the IV and DV in this case than is defendant culpability.  Likewise, the 
relations between weapon presence, beliefs about weapon presence, and eyewitness credibility 
and defendant culpability were not significant mediational relations; nor were relations between 
identification speed, belief about identification speed, and eyewitness credibility and defendant 
culpability ratings.  This may be because these DVs are not as directly relevant to the IV and 
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mediator as the eyewitness credibility ratings were for eyewitness age and beliefs about 
eyewitness age.   
The results of this investigation highlight a potential need for juror education concerning 
factors that can influence eyewitness reliability and accuracy.  In cases where legitimate 
concerns exist regarding the reliability of eyewitness memory (e.g., the eyewitness is a child, a 
weapon was present during the event, the eyewitness took a long time to identify, etc.), attorneys 
may be wise to include voir dire questions to expose juror beliefs when such beliefs might bear 
on the case outcome. Although voir dire in general is not a particularly effective safeguard (van 
Wallendael, Cutler, Devenport, & Penrod, 2007), jurors with problematic expectations about 
relevant eyewitness issues could be removed through peremptory challenges.  Further, during 
trials in which one of these eyewitness situations arises, attorneys can call expert witnesses to 
testify about the limitations of memory, which can potentially sensitize jurors to factors that 
predict better/worse eyewitness performance (van Wallendael et al., 2007; Cutler et al., 1990).  If 
erroneous juror beliefs can be corrected during trial, their impact may be reduced. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
The primary limitation of the current studies concerns the utilization of written trial 
simulations and undergraduate student participants.  Simulation studies, particularly those 
relying on undergraduate students, are sometimes criticized for lacking in real-world 
consequentiality (Bornstein & McCabe, 2005; Vidmar, 2008).  Such criticisms are especially a 
concern when courts and policy makers evaluate research findings (Monahan & Walker, 2005).  
However, reviews of mock jury research have demonstrated few systematic differences as a 
function of simulation verisimilitude (see, e.g., Bornstein, 1999; Bornstein & McCabe, 2005).   
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Other limitations include the fact that we did not include deliberation as part of the juror 
decision-making process, and the absence of a manipulation check in Study 1.  The lack of a 
manipulation check limits the interpretations we can make about our findings.  The fact that we 
used single items to measure juror attitudes for each of the three belief variables restricts our 
ability to calculate reliability coefficients.  Although the measures were face valid, it is possible 
that our single items did not exactly tap into what we intended.  A possible direction for future 
research is to develop a questionnaire to measure jurors’ attitudes about these factors.  General 
attitudes toward eyewitnesses are not strong predictors of jurors’ decisions (Narby & Cutler, 
1994), but it is possible that a measure focusing on more specific beliefs (i.e., about which 
factors do and do not influence eyewitness reliability) would have more predictive utility (van 
Wallendael et al., 2007).  A psychometrically sound attitude questionnaire could then be used in 
future studies, as well in trial consultation, to examine how various judgments might be related. 
Future research should examine other ways in which jurors’ beliefs predict their trial 
judgments.  Further, the impact of interventions to reduce the effect of erroneous juror beliefs is 
needed.  Will voir dire deselection reduce the number of misinformed jurors and lead to less 
misinformed juries overall?  Can juries be educated during trial by the testimony of expert 
witnesses in such a way that erroneous beliefs can be modified before decisions are affected by 
them?  The present studies show that laypeople’s beliefs about what (and how) select factors 
influence eyewitness reliability vary, and that those beliefs predict their judgments at trial. 
Attorneys and the courts therefore need to take jurors’ beliefs into account.
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Table 1 
Study 1 Descriptive Statistics             
 
       
Prior Witness Age Belief 
Measure 
Defendant Culpability (%) Eyewitness Credibility* 
     Adults more Reliable M SD M SD 
6 yr-old eyewitness 50.83 28.58 2.57 0.92 
11 yr-old eyewitness 59.70 23.90 3.32 0.80 
42 yr-old eyewitness 68.44 23.47 3.89 0.95 
74 yr-old eyewitness 53.10 26.20 2.97 1.02 
   Children more Reliable     
6 yr-old eyewitness 81.00 31.31 3.80 1.30 
11 yr-old eyewitness 71.22 28.94 3.56 0.73 
42 yr-old eyewitness 71.25 16.52 3.75 0.50 
74 yr-old eyewitness 48.38 25.29 2.63 0.52 
Note: The belief dichotomies represented here were created by recoding the belief variable.  Participants indicating 
agreement (answering 4 or 5) were categorized as “child believers” (n = 26), participants who answered 1 or 2 were 
categorized as “non-believers” (n = 125), neutral participants are not included (n = 49).  *Credibility variables were 
measured on a scale of one to five, with one as least credible and five as most credible.  N=151. 
 
 
       
Prior Witness Focus Effect Belief 
Measure 
Defendant Culpability (%) Eyewitness Credibility* 
     Believes in Weapon Effect M SD M SD 
Weapon Present 58.50 26.93 3.11 1.08 
Weapon Absent 56.73 29.42 3.41 1.08 
   Does not Believe in Weapon Effect     
Weapon Present 66.10 21.48 3.50 0.98 
Weapon Absent 65.79 24.89 3.21 1.02 
Note: The belief dichotomies represented here were created by recoding the belief variable.  Participants indicating 
agreement (answering 4 or 5) were categorized as “believers” (n = 95), participants who answered 1 or 2 were 
categorized as “non-believers” (n = 57), and neutral participants are not included here (n = 48).  *Credibility variables 
were measured on a scale of one to five, with one as least credible and five as most credible.  N=152.
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Figure 1.  Weapon presence and weapon focus belief interaction on eyewitness credibility.   
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Table 2 
Study 2 Descriptive Statistics             
 
       
Prior Identification Speed Belief 
Measure 
Defendant Culpability (%) Eyewitness Credibility* 
     Believe Speed Helps Accuracy M SD M SD 
Fast Eyewitness Decision 60.66 30.77 3.41 1.02 
Slow Eyewitness Decision 52.56 30.87 3.44 1.09 
   Believes Speed Hinders Accuracy     
Fast Eyewitness Decision 76.22 26.12 3.83 0.81 
Slow Eyewitness Decision 54.38 25.34 3.08 0.97 
Note: The belief dichotomies represented here were created by recoding the belief variable.  Participants 
indicating agreement (answering 1 or 2) were categorized as “speed believers” (n = 91), participants who 
answered 4 or 5 were categorized as “slow believers” (n = 76), neutral participants are not included (n = 33).  
* Credibility variables were measured on a scale of one to five, with one as least credible and five as most 
credible. N=131. 
